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Abstract 
Scholarship on private military and security companies largely focuses on their regulation and 
oversight as security and reconstruction service providers. It gives scant attention, however, 
to their role as institutional reformers, advisors, and trainers. This article presents findings of 
an in-depth case study on the challenges of procuring advising and training services in 
Afghanistan. Sixty-seven semi-structured interviews were conducted with elite and mid-level 
officials embedded within the Afghan defense and interior ministries, national army, and 
national and local polices forces. We evaluate an existing contracting framework for the 
purchase and integration of complex products with this data and find that rules, relationship 
strategies, governance mechanisms, and mutual understanding are critical in security sector 
reform training and advising contracts. Reliance on the private sector to provide these 
services will likely remain high, thus, a sharp focus on mutually beneficial outcomes that 
retain flexibility and accountability is necessary over the long run. 
Introduction 
Over the last two decades, the international community has invested enormously in 
reforming defense and internal security institutions in fragile states. Security sector reform 
(SSR)1 is now an established security assistance model centered on promoting both 
effectiveness and democratic governance (e.g., civilian control and accountability) of state 
security forces (Hänggi, 2009; OECD-DAC, 2007). Yet, these programs have produced 
mixed outcomes at best despite an extensive commitment of financial and human resources 
(Brzoska & Law, 2007; Scheye & Peake, 2005; Sedra, 2010). Failures and setbacks have 
led some scholars to conclude that internationally led SSR—and postwar statebuilding more 
broadly—are simply overambitious, if not misguided, given the historical record (Andersen, 
2011; Egnell & Haldén, 2009; Herbst, 2004). Others argue that mixed results suggest that 
the international community should renew its commitments but implement SSR more 
judiciously (Call & Wyeth, 2008; Paris & Sisk, 2009; Scheye, 2010). 
A key element of smarter SSR programming involves improving the use and 
oversight of private military and security companies (PMSCs) as training and mentoring 
service providers to host national security institutions. The literature on PMSCs focuses 
almost exclusively on contractor legal status, regulation, and oversight as providers of 
physical security, logistics, and reconstruction services (Avant, 2005; Chesterman & 
                                            
 
 
1 SSR is a multinational policy tool aimed at transforming the security architecture (military, intelligence, and law 
enforcement services; defense and interior bureaucracies; legislative oversight committees; and special courts) 
in transitioning and post-conflict countries into more effective, professional, and democratically accountable state 
institutions. The term “security sector” typically applies to this set of core state actors, but it also can include civil 
society and non-state armed groups, such as local militia, NGO watchdog groups, and the media. (Hänggi, 2009; 
OECD-DAC, 2007). 
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Lehnardt, 2007; de Nevers, 2010; Singer, 2008). It gives limited attention to the use of 
PMSCs as reformers, trainers, and advisors—agents of the state—who promote the reform 
and development of foreign military and police institutions in conflict-prone states. To date, 
research has only explains why military and police training is outsourced (Cusumano, 2010; 
Martin & Wilson, 2011), highlights calls for stronger government regulation and oversight of 
human rights and rule of law promotion, and recommends stronger analysis of whether the 
use of PMSCs as foreign trainers actually saves money (Avant, 2002). Yet, with rare 
exception (Ebo, 2008; Mancini, 2005), the literature views PMSCs “merely as an object of 
SSR … as bodies to be regulated” rather than as change agents and technical assistance 
providers implementing donor states’ foreign policy (Cusumano, 2010, p. 4). 
In extreme cases such as Afghanistan, the overall scale of reconstruction contracts 
for security, development, logistics, and engineering support greatly overshadow those for 
training and mentoring services. This situation has led principal auditors—the Special 
Investigator for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), U.S. Defense and State Department 
Inspectors General, U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), and U.S. Congressional 
Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC)—to prioritize investigations of larger purchases 
(e.g., construction, weapons sales, and logistics support) over smaller and less easily 
evaluated purchases involving human-to-human capacity building (CWC, 2011; DoD IG & 
DoS IG, 2011; GAO, 2012a; SIGAR, 2009). Human capital services are critical, however, to 
developing technical and administrative capacity and infusing democratic substance into 
state institutions. To date, few efforts at evaluating the procurement and management of 
these services have occurred. This paper contributes a deeper understanding of the 
challenges of achieving goal alignment for complex services in a conflict-prone setting. 
Through an in-depth case analysis of training and advising efforts across 
Afghanistan, this paper presents preliminary findings on perspectives gained from 67 
ethnographic interviews with diverse stakeholders involved in Afghan security ministry and 
security force (ANSF) development. Our findings to date suggest that rules, relationship 
strategies, governance mechanisms, and mutual understanding are critical to using 
contracts to purchase complex services for SSR. Consequently, the U.S. government needs 
a contracting framework that deliberately considers the multifactorial challenges of SSR 
training and advising in complex environments. 
Six sections follow. In the next section, we provide background on SSR and 
contracting for training and advisory services. Next, we introduce the case study, our 
methodology, and preliminary findings. We evaluate these initial findings against Brown et 
al.’s (2010) framework for complex products. We highlight parallels to the need for 
addressing buyer-seller uncertainty and contract incompleteness. However, the model falls 
short in suggesting context-specific governance mechanisms that would hold up in a 
complex contracting scenario like Afghanistan. The conclusion overlays the implications of 
these findings on the public management and contract governance challenges associated 
with purchasing complex services, such as ministerial training and advising in conflict-prone 
environments.  
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The Complexity of Procuring SSR Training and Advisory Services 
Outsourcing SSR training and advising services in fragile states complicates the 
long-term goal of establishing a functioning and accountable security sector in two ways. 
First, the scale of SSR activities (OECD-DAC, 2007; UN, 2008) and the demand for human 
and financial capital for capacity and statebuilding efforts far exceed the capabilities of 
donor2 governments’ expeditionary capacity—the United States included. Consequently, 
donors rely on a security network of governmental (civilian and military), non-governmental, 
and private firms to conduct these missions (Cusumano, 2010, p. 8). This presents 
additional coordination and oversight challenges. Second, SSR necessitates the host-nation 
state accept—”locally own” (Donais, 2008)—donor-sponsored reforms and programs. In 
some cases, contracting out technical assistance may place PMSC personnel in a divided 
principal scenario (Cusumano, 2010, p. 27). This situation creates a dilemma in which 
PMSCs work under conditions of conflicting interests while seeking cooperation with host 
nation actors, or worse, they may withhold information or collude with either the host nation 
or donor state, or both, to protect their long-term interests (Avant, 2005, p. 125). 
These contracting issues are common to internationally led statebuilding. 
Nevertheless, the nature of training and advising foreign security forces adds complexity to 
overseas contracting in at least three critical ways. 
First, there is a significant supply and demand challenge for qualified trainers and 
advisors. The demand is most acute during large-scale operation and translates into greater 
reliance on the private sector and other coalition partners, especially for police training 
(Perito, 2004). Training and advising foreign security forces requires professionals with a 
unique combination of traits including extensive technical or subject matter expertise; 
advanced cultural and language training; and distinct personality attributes associated with 
the ability to influence and resolve conflicts in austere foreign environments (Bayley and 
Perito, 2010 pp. 120–124, 149–150; Gerspacher, 2012, p. 2; NTM-A, 2011; Panarelli, 2009, 
p. 3). These highly specialized and desirable experts are in limited supply and difficult to 
identify without a robust personal network in the military or law enforcement communities. 
For example, the most qualified U.S. military individuals for these positions are retired 
military officers and non-commissioned officers with extensive strategic planning, special 
operations, or logistics backgrounds. Likewise, top candidates from the law enforcement 
community typically have experience in federal (e.g., the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
U.S. Marshals, Drug Enforcement Agency, and the Department of Justice’s International 
Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program), state, or metropolitan law enforcement 
(e.g., New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Boston) agencies with specialized investigation, 
anti-gang, counternarcotic, and counterterrorism subunits.  
However, federalism complicates the United States’ ability to provide consistent rule 
of law and police training abroad. The United States lacks a national constabulary force—
similar to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, French Gendarmerie, or Italian Carabinieri—
with a fixed set of national policing standards. Consequently, the pool of available U.S. 
police trainers and advisors varies significantly in experience, education, and exposure to 
                                            
 
 
2 We use the term donor state throughout this paper to represent nations providing financial, material, or human 
resources in support of SSR programs in fragile states. 
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different state and local policing traditions and criminal procedures, which may contribute to 
inconsistencies in expertise and advice. 
Second, there is wide variation in staffing needs and requirements for training and 
advisory positions. There are significant differences in both context (ministerial development 
vs. basic training vs. embedded operational advising) and functions (defense vs. law 
enforcement) and in the corresponding advisor skills and expertise required across these 
different settings. For example, military and police trainers require a specific background 
and aptitude, are usually based out of a fixed training facility, and typically follow a set 
program of instruction (POI) with little discretion for deviation. Alternatively, embedded 
advisor positions, when filled by a civilian contractor, are often filled individually and daily 
tasks and interactions vary widely depending on the operational context (strategic vs. 
tactical). This variation is most prevalent at the ministerial level, which demands a careful 
mix of expert advisors—military officers, defense and law enforcement civil servants, and 
contract advisors—to develop enterprise-level capabilities3 (Gerspacher, 2012; NTM-A, 
2011; Panarelli, 2009; author interviews, see Appendix A4). 
Priorities often change in a dynamic environment. Consequently, designing contracts 
with the flexibility to allow leaders to maintain continuity between advisors and their host 
nation counterparts—while reallocating available talent to emerging needs—is a significant 
challenge. Yet designing such contracts demands a degree of task specificity and certainty 
that seldom exists, and writing rules into formal and complete contracts for contract 
personnel that possess the right range of skills, capabilities, and experiences is difficult to 
standardize in a legal document. Professional qualities—such as the appropriate exercise of 
discretion on sensitive policy issues with senior officials in which trust and cultural 
sensitivities are required—are difficult to standardize. Over-writing the contract can constrain 
labor flexibility. Too little specificity with regards to uncontractible qualities risks a failure of 
common understanding about what personnel attributes are needed. 
Third, mission goals—often highly subjective, difficult to evaluate, and sensitive to 
the existing security and political situation—increase contracting complexity. By extension, 
goal ambiguity makes it difficult to specify measurable objectives in training and advising 
services contracts. In fragile states mired in conflict, the need to generate security forces 
quickly at the expense of quality has significant implications for contract design. Contracts, 
standards of performance (SOP), and programs of instruction (POIs) are designed for 
expedience, are focused on basic individual tasks, and are assessed primarily by easily 
quantifiable input, activity, and output metrics, as opposed to outcome-oriented and quality-
based measures. For example, the current police training model in Afghanistan is an eight-
week long introductory training course, designed to rapidly develop uniformed police. By 
comparison, most Western police training programs require a minimum of six months in a 
classroom setting and another minimum of six months of probationary supervision in the 
field. Given limitations in a combat zone, including widespread illiteracy among recruits, 
NATO and U.S. soldiers and civilian contractors are left to evaluate, often in an ad-hoc 
                                            
 
 
3 For example, human resources, logistics, and acquisitions, as well as more specialized policy and functional 
capabilities, such as strategic planning, intelligence collection, counternarcotics, and internal affairs. 
4 This was also confirmed in several interviews with NATO advisors to the Afghan Ministry of Interior. Note: we 
granted all interview participants confidentiality for this study due to the sensitive nature of topics discussed. We 
provide a full listing of participants’ rank, position, and related details in Appendix A. 
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fashion, what they can, which means graduation and attrition rates, marksmanship scores, 
and basic tasks such as wearing a uniform correctly and extending common courtesies 
(author interviews, Appendix A). These metrics say little, however, about larger institutional 
trends of professional development and whether these efforts are tied to longer term goals 
of security, stability, and sustainability. 
Consequently, contracting for these types of complex services produces highly 
specialized investments in recruiting, selecting, training, and retaining qualified contract 
personnel. As Williamson notes (1979, p. 243), the need for specialized types of human 
capital represents more “idiosyncratic investments.” These investments often demand robust 
oversight structures to govern the activities of human assets providing complex services in a 
limited labor market. The contracts governing these types of exchanges are often with 
monopsonistic buyers. They are also typically incomplete, lacking fully predetermined 
requirements due to the need for flexibility to address unforeseen contingencies. This 
incompleteness produces higher transaction costs for the internal provision of the service—
the make—of the buyer. Moreover, like any sunk cost, buyers cannot easily recover 
investments in human assets engaged in a complex service if the relationship with the seller 
later expires.  
Donor governments contract for the building of host nation capacities in a limited 
pool of advisors and trainers. This limited labor market poses a significant contract design 
and management challenge because the assets are neither firm specific, easily recovered, 
nor readily evaluated due to the lack of measurable individual output as it contributes to 
changes in host-nation outcomes. In part, to be a smart-buyer of services, the government 
needs to have its own in-house expertise to assess capabilities and performance 
adequately. Given the types of capacity gaps in the government’s acquisition workforce 
(DoD and DoS IG, 2011; GAO, 2012b; SIGAR, 2009), the buyers design contracts that 
measure performance on the input side (i.e., number of personnel trained) and leave sellers 
accountable for only meeting initial staffing thresholds. As a result, the contracts often lack 
measurable indicators that hold specific individuals, units, or organizations accountable. Like 
other complex investments, the human assets of the type described in this paper offer 
services that are highly asset specific, not easily observed or measured and take place in 
environments of high uncertainty and low frequency, meaning that buyers and sellers do not 
necessarily build relationships on trust and reputation (Williamson 1981, p. 561–566).5 
Therefore, within the organizational ecology of providing SSR services in fragile state 
environments, donor and host nation principals should jointly develop contracted 
governance structures aligned with mutual goals. However, given the conditions and the 
uncertainty associated with providing complex services in fragile states, mutual 
understanding can be difficult to spell out completely, especially while attempting to 
preserve flexibility and discretion and to minimize the risks associated with lock-in.  
Contracting Support to Afghan Security Sector Training and Development 
As of April 2012, the United States has appropriated $89.42 billion to Afghanistan’s 
reconstruction since late 2001 (SIGAR, 2012, p. 4). It holds a dubious record of effectively 
                                            
 
 
5 This is a point we address in our findings as the original contract between DoD and MPRI changed when 
DynCorp won the contract in 2010, leaving the US government, donor governments, and the Afghan Ministry of 
Defense to reestablish working relationships with new contractor personnel. 
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programming this flood of security assistance. The congressional enactment of the 
Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC); the establishment of the Special Investigator 
General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR); and the numerous audits and 
investigations into fraud, waste, abuse, and contract mismanagement are no surprise, given 
the massive resource commitment, challenging environment, and myriad actors involved. 
More concerning, however, is the CWC’s finding that between $31 billion and $61 billion of 
U.S. taxpayer funds were lost to fraud and abuse. Congress’s decision to seal hearing 
records until 2031 is remarkable (Hodge, 2011). 
Nearly two-thirds of the total figure spent in Afghanistan (approximately $50.6 billion) 
has been directed toward the development of the ANSF through the establishment of the 
Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), intended to pay for its training, equipping, operations, 
and sustainment. In FY2011, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) obligated more than 
$16 billion in Afghanistan reconstruction funds on contracts ($11 billion through the ASFF) 
for a diverse range of services, including military base and facility defense; logistical, 
maintenance, and transportation support; dining facility operations; construction services 
(roads, schools, and buildings); and training and mentoring Afghan security forces (GAO, 
2012b, p. 1). Over the past decade, three firms—DynCorp, International; Military 
Professional Resources, Inc. (L3/MPRI, now Engility); and Academi (formerly Xe and 
Blackwater USA)—have been the primary PMSC firms providing training and advising 
services to the Afghan army, national police forces, and the Afghan Defense and Interior 
ministries (Figure 1).6  
                                            
 
 
6 As the timeline in Figure 6 in Appendix C depicts, from 2004 to 2010 DynCorp was the leading provider of 
police trainers and law enforcement advisors, although Academi provided some specialized support to the 
Afghan Border Police. Likewise, MPRI was the leading provider of trainers and advisors for the Afghan Army and 
Ministry of Defense. Following a contested rebidding process in 2010, DynCorp took over as the lead training 
and advising service provider across the Afghan security forces. Contract oversight responsibility for the Afghan 
army and police training programs was originally split between the DoD and the US Department of State’s 
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), respectively. In 2009, the DoD assumed full 
control of contract oversight and administration for all training and mentoring services provided to the ANSF, 
including both the ministries of defense and interior and the Afghan military and police. 
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 Timeline of Afghan Training and Advising Contracts/Task Orders, 2004–
Present 
(http://www.usaspending.gov) 
After examining the contracts, we conservatively estimate that the Unites States has 
spent at least $5 billion since 2004 on the procurement of trainers and advisors to Afghan 
security forces—just over 5% of the total funds allocated for Afghanistan’s reconstruction. 
Using U.S. government spending records, we constructed a table of these major contracts 
and task orders, broken down by recipient firms, U.S. government purchasing agencies, 
Afghan partner institutions, and total obligations (Appendix C, Table 5). FOIA requests were 
made for each contract and task order.7  
Five billion dollars is no small figure for such a highly asset-specific investment 
whose value is difficult to ascertain. Training and advising foreign security forces is a 
boutique service and often more difficult to measure and evaluate in comparison to the 
                                            
 
 
7 DoD (US Army) contracts have been adjudicated and are currently being processed. DoS/INL contracts have 
been acknowledged, but have been pending adjudication for over six months. 
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larger and more easily evaluated services for logistics support; engineering and construction 
projects; and procurement of weapons, equipment, and other material goods.8  
Method 
This case study is supported by data collected from an ongoing in-depth examination 
of how the United States and NATO coalition forces seek to influence the transfer of 
organizational capacity and professionalism to their Afghan security force counterparts. Data 
collection occurred between March 2012 and April 2013.  
Sampling 
Primary data consists of 67 military and civilian elite stakeholders that participated in 
a confidential semi-structured interview (Creswell, 2009, p. 179).9 Participants represent a 
stratified-purposive sample (Teddlie & Yu, 2007, pp. 79–80) of individuals who have served 
directly in an advisory, training, or partnered capacity with Afghan security forces; who have 
directly observed NATO-ANSF partnered or partnering activities; or who have been involved 
in the evaluation or program management of such activities. Exploring their interactions and 
observations of others’ interactions with Afghan security forces during their period, or 
periods, of service in Afghanistan was critically important.10 To maximize 
representativeness, participants were recruited based on four overarching, nested strata: 
level of analysis; alignment with core Afghan security institutions; type of partnering 
engagements; and participant attributes (see Figure 2).11 External observers of NATO 
partnering efforts and subject matter experts were recruited to enhance validity through 
triangulation.12 
                                            
 
 
8 For example, the US Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP IV) is a 10-year, $150-billion 
contract spread across four companies: DynCorp, KBR, Fluor, and SERCO. Contrast that with the US Army’s 
ongoing Afghan training and advising contract with DynCorp worth $232 million over two years and three orders 
of magnitude smaller. 
9 The average length of interviews is 71 minutes. All participants provided written consent to the confidential 
interview and audio recording following an approved protocol. 
10 Stratified-purposive sampling was necessary due to the multilayered vertical and horizontal alignment of NATO 
personnel with the Afghan National Security Forces. Random sampling was both impractical and unhelpful due 
to the time required to build trust and credibility with this population and the research need for candor and 
contextual richness. 
11 The stratified sample of participants is quite diverse and largely reflects the NATO-ISAF command structure, 
where the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan focuses on institutional development of the ANSF (i.e., recruiting, 
training, equipping, and ministerial advising) while the International Joint Command focuses on operations with 
Afghan army and police units in the field, including providing embedded advisor teams and ground forces to 
conduct combined operations. It includes individuals who have personally advised Afghan officials, from Afghan 
ministers and deputy ministers down to the lowest Afghan Army platoon leader or district police chief. 
Consideration was given to participants’ time and location of service in Afghanistan to ensure a primary analytical 
focus on the period from 2008 to 2013 (e.g., the Afghanistan surge) when NATO’s focus on ANSF partnership 
and development was at its greatest. Notably, several participants served on multiple tours in Afghanistan, with 
experience dating back to 2003. Participant location also is an important factor, to ensure adequate variation of 
experiences among tactical level participants. 
12 It is worth noting that five participants are female, despite that fact that the overwhelming majority of Afghan 
security force advising and partnering activities have been conducted by male combat arms and civilian 
personnel.  
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 Stratified Sampling Tree Map 
Data Collection and Analysis 
Interviews consisted of a core set of open-ended questions on the participants’ 
background, interactions with ANSF, influencing approaches, and observed changes in 
ANSF capacity and professionalism (Appendix B). Interviews were interpreted via content 
analysis (Krippendorf, 2004) though the use of codes that link raw data to broader analytical 
concepts and theories (Saldaña, 2013, p. 3-5). Coding of the data related to contractor 
support to ANSF training and development, references to civilian contractor trainer and 
advisor employment, collaboration, performance, and oversight with coded segments 
varying from individual sentences to whole paragraph responses (Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008). Code labels were then organized into a hierarchy of thematic categories for 
further analysis. 
Results and Discussion 
The initial coding revealed a range of contract design and oversight issues 
associated with ministerial advising, tactical training and advising, the contractor’s individual 
characteristics, and his performance. From this we identified three key issues to address in 
this paper: the selection processes for trainers and advisers; contract design implications of 
a highly asset specific investment in human intelligence and capability requirements; and 
labor market issues in terms of availability of contracted personnel to fulfill the operational 
requirements associated with ministerial advising and training. These issues are not 
mutually exclusive. There is interdependence among them, especially in how participants 
articulate them in operational terms. 
Trainer–Advisor Selection 
Our findings suggest that there is significant need for more effective screening of 
personnel to serve as ministerial advisors. This need can be quite difficult to fulfill because 
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there is not a “Yellow Pages Test” of personnel in which you can search for those who have 
the training, socio-cultural-political skills, and defense and security policy backgrounds to 
enter a fragile state setting and build relationships with host nationals in the highest 
positions of influence and authority. While on the one hand having institutional policy-making 
experience in a defense ministry is an important skill set to possess, many of the contractors 
who are hired are former military officers who reached the rank of lieutenant colonel (O-5) or 
colonel (O-6) because of their field level tactical experience. In the majority of cases, most of 
these individuals’ prior military experience was not spent working in a political-bureaucratic 
environment such as the Pentagon, for example, in a Secretary of Defense or service 
Secretary’s staff posting, serving in a joint liaison role with other service branches, or 
interacting with elected or appointed policy makers. A consequential tradeoff follows. 
Selecting by rank and grade may provide a degree of field-level legitimacy with both 
uniformed colleagues and host-nation officials with prior military service, and perhaps some 
degree of subject matter expertise. However, this does not guarantee that these individuals 
have both the relationship-building skills necessary to develop trust and credibility and begin 
to influence the thinking and actions of their host-nation counterparts especially on policy 
and public administration issues.  
For PMSC firms responding to request for proposals (RFPs), there is often a 
standards of performance (SOP) document that outlines key provisions of what contracted 
personnel are expected to do, but most of these are technical elements associated with 
development of: protocols, processes, and metrics for collection and reporting of 
information; training doctrine and plans; and quality assurance mechanisms. Appendix D 
provides a snapshot of a recent SOP for advisors in the Afghan Ministry of Defense detailing 
the necessary job requirements for a logistics advisor. These SOPs and their fit with the 
relative needs of ministerial officials in conflict-prone environments such as Afghanistan are 
often misaligned because the contracting officials working for the sponsoring donor 
governments, such as federal civilian acquisition officials in the DoD, lack expertise in the 
capabilities and requirements necessary to fulfill the mission, goals, and meet the 
performance targets. On the one hand, it would be easy to demand selection based on 
quality, but on the other hand, if the contracting award officials have no more information 
than those who wrote the RFPs and SOPs, then quality becomes an ephemeral and 
ambiguous criterion. While the case could be made for being more selective of the 
personnel hired to fill positions, at the end of the day, PMSCs have to meet the performance 
objectives outlined in the contract. If a contract calls for 85 personnel with certain types of 
skills, the contractor is going to be held more accountable for whether they hired 85 
personnel to fill those positions and less so for whether the personnel were the most 
qualified, best experienced, or had other relevant skills. 
Our interviews reveal a range of outcomes associated on the selection issue, with 
some asserting that the contracted personnel were qualified and others stating that their 
work experiences with contractors were less successful. As one interviewee said in a 
response representative of the majority of our interviews, 
You have some that were very good at working with their Afghan 
counterparts, guys that would sort of work that soft approach. And then you 
would have those other guys who would sort of try to force things through. It 
goes back to selection of who you’re hiring and their experience and how 
they approach things. This goes to I think a contradiction with the Army 
because they like to do things quickly. They like to hire en masse. If you want 
mass, you’re probably going to get a whole lot of folks you don’t really need. 
(author interview) 
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It is on this issue of selection, that hiring the right advisers is challenging work. In 
addition to “expertise,” advisers also have to understand context and socializing an idea and 
developing the ability to influence policy incrementally, at the margins, and over time in a 
way that doesn’t threaten their Afghan counterparts. Having a successful tactical reputation 
at the battalion or brigade level does not mean that person has the ability to train, advise, 
and teach.  
Because the contracts were both to advise and train in the Ministry of Defense and 
the Ministry of Interior, the PMSCs had a range of contract personnel they were responsible 
for hiring. On the issue of police training, one of our interviewees offered a representative 
perspective that highlights points above: 
You need a police officer, so you hire one and stick him in the job. Are you 
going to train him to become a trainer? No! You’re going to stick him in that 
job. That’s a huge mistake because a police officer knows how to practice 
policing. They know how to arrest someone, how to investigate, how to patrol, 
they know the practice of policing in the United States. How do they build 
someone else’s capacity? Just mentoring and saying to a police officer in 
Afghanistan “this is how I do things at home,” is useless because they’re not 
going to do it this way over there. So, there’s a belief in Washington, and in 
the West in general or the donor community I should say [that when it comes 
to] providing troops or police officers or any capacity builders that we just 
grab somebody who has that expertise back at home and then we don’t 
transform them in to an adviser or mentor. We just stick them in a situation, in 
a different country, having to do completely different things with no authority, 
and we hope that they’ll just build the capacity of someone. It’s a huge 
problem! (author interview) 
On the defense side, this situation was best illustrated by an interviewee who offered a 
representative perspective about a contractor’s past training and experience as a guide for 
their work as an adviser: 
I was slightly underwhelmed with the performance of several contractors in 
terms of not only how they were doing the advising mission but also their 
credentials for doing so. ... We’re talking about building a Ministry of State at 
the highest levels of a sovereign nation and several of the contractors that I 
worked with had never ever worked at an institutional level above division. 
Some had never been above brigade. Several of them have never worked at 
a headquarters staff, or in the Pentagon, or in any kind of civilian governance 
institution that they were either principally in charge of or in a very senior 
assisting role—it just struck me as increasingly odd. Not that some of them 
weren’t good people, not that that some of them didn’t have great combat 
records, or military backgrounds, but they simply did not have the depth of 
experience or perspective to do their jobs at the level of, or [at the] 
remuneration that we’re paying them. (author interview). 
Selecting the right people is an investment in quality and success, but this mindset 
was absent. The GAO’s mantra is that $1 of audit saves $10 on implementation. One 
interviewee offered a similar perspective:  
I think if anybody wanted to spend one more dollar adding a little more 
scrutiny to the preparation of advisors and screening of advisors, I would 
think that would be worth probably $10 in savings of having the wrong people 
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out there—not only the wrong people, but people that create systems and 
problems that cause more problems in the long run. (author interview) 
This call for an investment in preparing individuals to serve as advisors was echoed 
in quite different ways across the respondents. The issue of differentiating successful 
advisers from those perceived to be less successful is well illustrated by the following 
interviewee: 
I actually believe that the key to all good advising is based on three things: 
relationships, relationships, relationships. Everybody places, in my opinion, 
far too much reliance on this subject matter expert business. I learned a long 
time ago that just because you’re a subject matter expert or just because you 
have an eagle [Colonel’s rank] on your collar does not make you an expert in 
everything, and when it comes to building relationships, a lot of people are 
just not cut out for that. Without the relationship I do not believe you can have 
the difficult, sometimes even contentious, discussions required to effect real 
meaningful change. I think one error we make across the board, not just in 
MoDA [Ministry of Defense Advisors program], is just throwing people into 
advisory jobs, calling them advisors, and they’re in many cases more 
detrimental than they are effective. So I think there has to be a real hard 
selection process to pick the right people. In fact, I’ve told [a General], for 
example, if he were putting together a team of let’s say 10 guys to go to—I’ll 
pick a country—Guatemala, I wouldn’t care what the other nine were like, but 
I would want the team leader to be the Zen master relationship builder 
because with that you can bring in subject matter experts all day long, but if 
you don’t have the relationship, a subject matter expert is a waste of time. 
They just come in and talk and the host may be deferential or he may just 
totally ignore you. (author interview) 
This point is contrasted by, although it does not necessarily dispute, the important 
role that subject matter experts and experience do play for advisors. This “pro/con reflection” 
on the value of subject matter experts is a recurring narrative illustrated among our 
respondents, each with his or her version of the story. This example captures the narrative 
well: 
Just because you wore a badge doesn’t mean you could be a good police 
advisor. I got a guy who’s a deputy sheriff in Norman, Oklahoma in a two-car 
police force. He knew how to give out tickets, he knew how to break up a bar 
fight, but as far as being a police professional to advise a country on how to 
set up their police force, no. I mean I had another guy that was a retired 
inspector—that is a special advisor to the police commissioner of the city of 
New York, okay? Contractors didn’t want to touch him but he was probably 
the best qualified guy to be an advisor, to be a police advisor. They didn’t 
want to touch him. It scared the daylights out of them. He knew too much. If 
he knew too much then he’s liable to fix it and then we’re liable to go home 
and the gravy train’s gone. So he ended up getting frustrated. He ended up 
going home and going back to work for the Police Commissioner of New York 
City. (author interview). 
A point made in this narrative, is that the New York City inspector made the other 
contractors nervous because they were afraid that if he fixed the problems, they would be 
out of jobs. This attitude is illustrative of the interdependent relationship between contract 
design and selection. We turn next to the difficulty of contract design. Following that 
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discussion, we will look at the labor market issue for a more refined understanding of why 
advisor selection is so challenging when using PMSCs.  
Contract Design Implications  
The data suggest a central challenge to contracting for training and advising services 
is that quality is not given serious consideration and that weakly specified hiring 
requirements—in terms of personnel experience, skill sets, training, and education—
seemed to almost perpetuate the contractor’s role in service provision. As one of our 
respondents put it, if performance were seriously considered and “if people went over there 
knowing that they had to stay until it was finished, I guarantee you it wouldn’t be 10 years” 
(author interview). 
For many of the reasons we cite above, there’s a balance, when contracting for 
training and ministerial advising within the MoI and MoD, between rigidly trying to specify 
every contingency and leaving the contract incomplete to ensure flexibility and discretion in 
how a contractor provides services. However, what we found in reviewing the documents 
and from the interviews is a consistently inconsistent process. Respondents described input- 
and output-based performance metrics that focused on filling slots and not on getting the 
right people. On the other hand, military and civilian personnel serving in trainer and advisor 
roles spoke of contractors with vast institutional knowledge, experience, and capabilities 
who could serve in additional roles and create value, but who complied with the letter of the 
law in their contracts and refused to provide information or become involved in certain 
training activities because that’s “not what their contracts incentivized” (author interviews).  
One participant expressed frustration with contracted personnel whose duties 
changed from being trainers to strictly evaluators—”We’re only evaluators, not trainers. Our 
job isn’t to train them on these skills, it’s to evaluate the training and say whether it’s good or 
not” (author interview). In this interview, what frustrated the respondent was the absence of 
a team approach to fulfilling the mission goals. This individual noted that the contractors in 
most cases had more experience, had been on the ground longer, possessed more 
institutional memory and capacity, but were only going to do what their contract required 
them to do. There was no goal alignment; just separate rice bowls, a reference to individual 
parties with their own incentives to maximize the level of resources they could secure. 
Specifying, requiring, measuring, incentivizing, and penalizing mission performance is 
difficult to write in a contract. As a result, stories like these are obstacles to success. 
Contracting for a collaborative team approach to problem solving is actually difficult in ways 
that Williamson and other contract theorists note (Battigalli & Giovanni, 2002; Hart & Moore, 
2008; Williamson, 1996). 
This is not a normative case of contractors being effective or not. It is how to align 
the overlapping goals, actions, and preferences of military, civilian government, and 
contractor personnel. This was simply missing. To be fair, other respondents, when 
discussing contractors, noted, “We couldn’t live without them. We couldn’t do our jobs 
without them” (author interview).  
The role and responsibilities of contractors spanned the continuum of respondent 
perspectives. Most significantly, this centered on the question of whether contractors were 
performing inherently governmental roles and responsibilities. Some respondents made 
clear that “the contractors don’t speak for the government” (author interview). Other 
respondents argued that contractors were more effectively embedded into mid-level 
institutional relationships with their host nation counterparts and that while ultimate policy 
decision-making does not take place at that level, implementation most certainly does. While 
policy-making may ultimately be decided at the top of ministries, proposals, ideas, and their 
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eventual implementation certainly emanated from middle-rank officials who were receiving 
guidance and feedback from contractors. Lack of recognition in the formal contracts of this 
effort frustrated numbers of active-duty military and government civilian personnel. In many 
of the contracts not only were there not individual performance accountability standards and 
agreements but also there were few, if any, clear mechanisms for rewarding effective 
personnel and addressing or dismissing ineffective personnel.  
Therefore, the contracts and SOPs of trainers and advisers—covering a small yet 
important role that PMSCs play in rebuilding governance capacity in the Afghan MoD and 
MoI—were viewed as rigid and incomplete, highly specified on input and output metrics, and 
divorced from meaningful measurement of outcomes and mission attainment. Respondents 
were clear that there is insufficient contract management and oversight capacity within the 
government. Quality is not written into the contracts (author interviews; SOP, Appendix D). 
This suggests an evaluation and accountability problem and that on-the-ground 
performance expectations are unrealistic.  
On this last point, respondents pointed to DynCorp’s work developing a national 
police force. As we heard repeatedly, context matters. For instance, the starting points are 
completely different between the U.S. and Afghanistan in terms of defense policy, homeland 
security, border patrol, and law enforcement. Yet training programs were developed for 
Afghan personnel who were illiterate, who had no prior law enforcement experience, and 
who were nevertheless expected to receive a “Basic Eight” week training course and then 
go out and competently police their communities. Viewed narrowly in terms of the contract, 
this program is effective and the contractor met his targets. From an implementation and 
sustainability perspective, this program is neither likely to be operational long-term nor lead 
to meaningful changes in policing and culture. 
Thin Labor Market 
When government decides to contract rather than produce or provide a service 
internally and with its own employees, the fundamental decision is often influenced by the 
degree of market competition that it can harness and leverage for its own goals, whether 
that is cost, quality, effectiveness, or simply scale of provision. However, in contracting for 
ministerial advisors and tactical trainers in Afghanistan, several issues shaped the degree of 
competition and available supply. As we noted above, advisors and trainers are complex 
human assets because of the investments that have often been made in their skill sets, 
experiences, training, and education. Indeed, it is fair to characterize the advisers needed to 
develop, shape, influence, implement, and evaluate institutional capacity building in the MoD 
and MoI as specialized investments and not as assets that are commercially available or 
that fall into the government-furnished categories often associated with other forms of 
acquisition and procurement. Evident in the timeline we provide above, the PMSC 
landscape is thin in terms of the number of firms responding to RFPs and competing for 
contract opportunities. 
As the Afghan mission grew, the pool of qualified trainers diminished and, 
consequently, so did the overall skills of the workforce (author interviews). This diminution of 
a skilled workforce has several causes.  
First, there was a change in the war’s strategic focus, and as a consequence of this 
re-focus, the original mentoring contract held by MPRI was rebid. MPRI had been in 
Afghanistan working with the MoD and Afghan National Army since April 2005 on training 
and advising issues, while DynCorp had been working with the Ministry of Interior since 
2004 on police training, opium poppy eradication, and building the training and advising 
capacities of the MoI. The only other PMSC was Academi (formerly Xe and Blackwater), and 
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it was engaged in training and advising the Afghan Border Police. In 2010, MPRI’s contracts 
ended and DynCorp won the competition to provide services not only to MoI but also to the 
MoD. This contract significantly changed the market of available contract personnel. 
Moreover, substantial controversy encircled this set of RFPs and awards, including bid 
protests to the GAO (GAO, 2010). In the end, MPRI largely transitioned out of contracted 
relationships with the MoD and considerable time was lost, almost two years by most 
accounts, between the departure of MPRI and its personnel and DynCorp’s arrival and 
standup of its own personnel.  
Second, lost during this contract transition period were institutionalized relationships 
and extensive, often well-qualified, manpower. A number of MPRI personnel were offered 
an opportunity to apply for positions with DynCorp and did so, but according to the interview 
respondents—and verified in the secondary contract documentation13—the new contract 
was less financially generous and had more performance targets on the input and output 
side, with clearer financial penalties for failing to meet the indicators. As a result, 
respondents universally observed a tradeoff between selection quality and fit relative to 
scale. For example, a story we heard repeatedly was that one benefit of the contract 
competition was that poor performers were going to be “sent packing.” However, under the 
new contract, there was a stated need for 2,000 personnel to assume various positions. 
Near the end of DynCorp’s fielding process they only received 1,200 qualified applicants. 
But with clear performance penalties of $10,000 per day for failing to have 2,000 personnel 
in place, we were told of a feverish effort to find another 800 people to fill the slots. So, as 
one respondent noted, “they left under bad terms and now they’re bringing them back” 
(author interview) while another respondent suggested that because the contract was 
designed wrongly in terms of the SOPs, but included penalties, the contractor was “fielding 
people that shouldn’t be fielded, but they have to or they will be fined so many tens of 
thousands per day” (author interview).  
This challenge was later accommodated slightly in 2012 by force reductions within 
NATO following the Afghan troop surge, specifically within the NATO Training Mission 
(NTM-A) command where all ministerial advisors (military, government civilians, and 
contractors) were assigned. The majority of ministerial advisors were U.S. military officers, 
typically the rank of colonel. The NTM-A drawdown and reorganization significantly reduced 
the total number of ministerial advisors, leaving a number of lower ranking individuals and 
contractors to pick up the remaining slack: “I’ve never seen so many [Colonels] in my life. 
But what’s happening now with that draw down is they’re getting pulled and they’re going 
away and lower ranks are coming in” (author interview). Noted by a range of respondents, 
many of these very individuals were those with laudable combat records, but 
“underwhelming” credentials or institutional experience for ministerial advising.  
The respondent quotes reflect and the documentation confirms that there was a high 
degree of contractor personnel within the PMSCs as a result of contracts being rebid; that 
the quality of the personnel was proportionally less than the demand and what the contract 
SOPs stated; and that an emphasis on holding the contractor accountable, an important 
component in any contract, gave way to penalties being applied on the input side of the 
                                            
 
 
13 FOIA requests were made for all contracts listed in Appendix C, Table 5. The process of receiving approval for 
and ultimately receiving the documents has been quite lengthy and the contracts and associated supporting 
materials have been heavily redacted. 
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equation. As a result, the need to fill slots was viewed as more important than selecting 
quality personnel relative to the performance penalties assigned. It is unclear whether there 
was any consideration at the time of rebidding and changing the PMSC to the negative 
externalities and compromises that might result, in terms of institutional knowledge and of 
established ministerial advising relationships, ground level trust, and legitimacy between 
donor-funded PMSCs and host-national ministerial officials. Our respondents suggest that 
this issue was not on the radar of contracting officials, and results, as best these authors 
can ascertain, appear to confirm this.  
A Clear Need for a SSR Training and Advising Contracting Framework 
In general, the need for a contracting framework increases as governments around 
the world, especially the United States, enter into longer term contractual relationships for 
the procurement of complex services and products. Such contracts are often expensive, 
controversial, and viewed as high-risk. Brown et al. (2010) developed such a framework for 
the procurement of complex products. In this study, we draw upon their framework and 
apply it to the procurement of advising and training services, a complex service, in 
Afghanistan. In applying this framework, we evaluate its utility relative to the manner in 
which SSR services are contracted and the corresponding successes and limitations in a 
conflict-prone environment.  
We also draw upon transaction cost economics to understand complex services that 
are developed and implemented by human capital assets—themselves often the products of 
substantial investments in training, education, capabilities, and experiences—in a market 
that tends to be monopsonistic on the buyer side and is limited on the supply side because 
of the largely symmetric interdependence between buyers (donor states) and sellers 
(contractors). While Brown et al. also use a transaction cost approach, their focus is more on 
a complex product—an integrated system of ships, aviation, information technology, and 
logistics—as opposed to centering on individuals as complex assets. However, in both the 
procurement of complex products and services, ensuring goal alignment with a focus on 
win-win outcomes, accountable performance, and cost effectiveness is critical. 
In the case of Afghanistan, what Brown et al. recommend is consistent with what 
participants perceived as necessary to manage such a complex contracting relationship. 
Interview and documentation suggest the existing governance structure is insufficient, if not 
absent. Managing a complex contracting relationship, in other words, requires governing to 
solve a collective action problem and guiding each side’s incentives away from pursuing 
their own self-interest at the expense of win-win cooperation. Developing the right 
governance mechanisms—ones that give rise to coordination and information exchange 
while promoting flexibility and accountability—are important for creating value in challenging 
environments that require complex service investments.  
Both complex services and products have multiple components integrated into a 
system that addresses various missions and that frequently consists of highly uncertain 
design specifications. In this regard, donor states and contractors (buyers and sellers) often 
have high uncertainty about the service or product, its production costs, quality tradeoffs, 
and the value of its capabilities. This is consistent with our preliminary findings of ministerial 
advising and training in Afghanistan. While SOPs exist and contracts over time, from 2003–
2013, have been increasingly formalized with clearer metrics of performance, it is also true 
that there remains high uncertainty about what capabilities are needed, how they are to be 
used, and what indicators should be incorporated to evaluate performance and hold the 
respective parties accountable. In the case of Afghanistan, those results are the degree to 
which (1) the Afghan army, police, and defense and interior ministries are being effectively 
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trained and developed; and (2) the manner in which institutional policy is being crafted and 
implemented in concert with Afghan counterparts. This high uncertainty leads to two 
important consequences for contract design and management.  
First, contract negotiation requires reducing uncertainty so that the product can be 
specified at contractible levels. Investments in reducing uncertainty are largely asset specific 
in that they have negligible value outside the contract, resulting in the classic “hold up” 
problem (Williamson, 1996). For the buyer, the hold up risk is that once a seller has been 
selected, no other potential sellers have made the necessary investments, so the 
advantaged seller may look to change the contract in its favor (David, 1985). Likewise, 
because the seller has only one buyer for its products, the buyer may also look to change 
the contract in its favor. These conditions are consistent with the interviews and secondary 
documentation. There appears to be agreement on several levels that SOPs and 
performance must be more clearly stated, agreed upon, monitored, measured, and 
evaluated against expected benchmarks or redressed through joint mediation and arbitration 
processes. However, the specificity of the SOPs and performance measures should not be 
confused with the capabilities required to achieve important mission goals.  
As we note earlier, the specificity and rigidity of SOPs and position requirements and 
qualifications increased exponentially over time and because of SIGAR, GAO, and CWC 
investigations and reports. But, this often took place at the expense of positional fit, quality, 
and the softer and often more uncontractible elements associated with hiring the right 
people to advise, mentor, and train. As a result, our interviewees suggested that firms 
aligned their behavior and actions with the manner in which incentives, performance 
measures, and sanctions were structured. It is perhaps unsurprising then that contractor 
firms needed to meet their numbers, get bodies into positions, and consumed themselves 
less with whether they had the right people and capabilities for achieving mission goals, i.e., 
having relationship builders in place that could effectively work both horizontally across units 
and divisions and vertically within respective ministries. It does appear though the parties 
recognize that each needs the other. What is much less clear, however, is the extent of the 
integration of PMSCs into the day-to-day work of providing training and advising, side-by-
side with military and government civilian personnel. To our knowledge and understanding, 
there are few, if any, formal statements of governance mechanisms associated with control, 
authority, delegation of responsibilities and risks, and the evaluation of results in a way that 
strengthens task and system accountability and transparency within the contracts.  
Second, contracts for complex products are necessarily incomplete. Even after 
buyers and sellers have made asset-specific investments to reduce uncertainty, it is not 
practical for either party to define fully the complex service or products’ qualities in a contract 
(Tirole, 1999). Doing so would both drive up the writing costs associated with specifying 
every possible contingency and constrain the discretion and flexibility necessary to adapt 
and resolve unforeseen issues. Consequently, the incomplete terms of the contract are 
negotiated later as the product is produced or service is performed and the exchange is 
executed. As we have already noted, there is the perception that the contracts are rigid on 
the one hand and ambiguous on the other. The rigidity comes from timelines associated with 
filling positions, meeting the overall stated number of formal positions to be filled, and having 
a certain number of personnel who fill technical and advising capability needs. But, as has 
also been suggested, this rigidity can and does actually undermine cooperation and fails to 
incentivize joint efforts.  
Again, we offer a caveat that we did hear of positive and successful contractor 
relationships with military, government civilian, and host nation counterparts. Unfortunately, 
it would appear that while these examples are not rare, more often than not participants 
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reported that relationships do not happen in this way. In part, good outcomes occur because 
of specific, required skills—the professional maturity and confidence to work alongside host 
nation counterparts, from senior ministry officials to local unit leader-power brokers, many 
carrying a host of often unrevealed preferences that may conflict with long-term mission 
goals, and the savvy to inform, persuade, coordinate, debate, and propose new or 
alternative solutions to policies, doctrine, processes, and procedures across the Afghan 
security sector. 
The Brown et al., investigation into contracting for complex products devotes little 
time on complex services, especially those executed by contractors. As a result, while their 
findings are generalizable to other potential complex products, the authors provide little 
guidance about how variation in context, institutional policy development, and a country’s 
relative stability and level of economic development might affect the implementation and 
evaluation of contractors delivering complex services. Our interviews suggest that while firm 
preference may indicate a desire for lock-in post-2014, individual contractor motivations vary 
and are not as monolithic as the present literature suggests. In fact, individual motives 
interact highly, and are more often aligned, with those they are serving than with their 
employers’ motives. 
Implications for U.S. Security Assistance Policy and Future Acquisition Research 
This article highlights the complexity of procuring security force training and advising 
services in fragile states. In these settings, donor states face the incredibly difficult task of 
designing contracts that, on the one hand, are flexible enough to allow for getting the right 
people in the job—the “Zen, master relationship builders”—and on the other hand, are 
governed and incentivized in a way that avoids future lock-in. 
This case study is relevant given the United States’ commitment to assist 
Afghanistan through 2024 (though tenuous without a signed bilateral security agreement). 
As long as the United States’ partnership with Afghanistan endures, civilian contractors will 
be required in Afghanistan into the near future. Furthermore, the case illustration of 
Afghanistan holds more generalizable application to future security assistance environments 
with a mix of military, government, and civilian contractors providing training and advising 
services. Broader application is essential given the current U.S. strategic defense guidance 
proclaiming, “we will seek to be the security partner of choice, pursuing new partnerships 
with a growing number of nations—including those in Africa and Latin America … [and] we 
will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security 
objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities” (DoD, 2012, 
p. 3). 
The ephemeral promise of a win-win outcome is the contract ideal. Still, 
policymakers cannot ignore the high transaction costs and complex principal-agent 
characteristics associated with overseas contracting. Unlike simple products, the terms of 
exchange for complex services are likely to be incomplete and to require high discretion and 
flexibility. However, they should also delimit clear performance standards and accountability 
measures. Incentivizing contractors to achieve ambiguous goals is problematic, but to say 
little about expectations in a manner that is measurable risks the inability to monitor 
contractor performance and preserve accountability. There are, nevertheless, contract 
design and management tools to get the right people with the right skills in these positions. 
Varying compensation vehicles, time periods with entry and exit ramps, compete/non-
compete clauses, and award fees and penalties are few examples. Most promising, 
integrated stakeholder governance teams can help with advisor selection challenges and 
structure expectations and understanding about what goal alignment means under certain 
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conditions. Moreover, they can provide continuous and fully dedicated monitoring, 
evaluation, and technical assistance in the design and implementation of these contracts. 
The focus on SSR contracting and the significance of developing context-specific 
contract governance mechanisms can serve as a catalyst for new scholarship and policy 
practice in an evidence-based framework that considers balancing the challenges of 
contracting for complex products and services with the need for a more integrated social 
sciences, law, and management approach. These disciplines can illuminate the range of 
policy environments in which institutions and individuals interact across a host of political, 
social, cultural, and legal dimensions in fragile governance ecosystems where incentives, 
rules, cooperation, and understanding shape effective development and implementation of 
SSR, a critical policy tool of security and economic development. 
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Appendix A: Sample Tables and Figures 
Table 2. Strategic Level Participants 
 








Office of Administrative Affairs (National Security Council & OMB) Advisor (1)
18 Lt. Colonel U.S. Air Force Advisor to Deputy Director General, OAA 12 months
Ministry of Defense & Afghan General Staff Advisors (12)
27 Colonel U.S. Army, Infantry Senior Advisor to Afghan Minister of Defense 10 months
14 Colonel Canadian Army, Infantry Senior Advisor to Afghan Minister of Defense 24 months
61 GS-15** Office of the Secretary of Defense Senior Advisor to Deputy MoD - Strategy and Policy
Asst. Chief of Advisors for Afghan Ministry of Defense Development
12 months
57 Contractor MPRI Senior Advisor to Deputy MoD - Strategy and Policy 24 months
26 GS-15 Office of the Secretary of Defense Senior Advisor to Deputy MoD - Aquisitions, Technology & Logistics 24 months
20 GS-14 Office of the Secretary of Defense Advisor to Deputy MoD - Installation Management 18 months
50 Colonel** U.S. Army, JAG Senior Advisor to MoD Legal Advisor
Senior Advisor to ANA General Staff - Legal
12 months
25 Colonel U.S. Army, Infantry Senior Advisor to Chief of Afghan National Army General Staff 12 months
45 Colonel** Canadian Army, Infantry Chief of Advisors, Afghan Ministry of Defense Development
Senior Advisor to Chief of Afghan National Army General Staff
Senior Advisor to Vice Chief of ANA General Staff
9 months
15 Colonel U.S. Army, Special Forces Senior Advisor to ANA General Staff G3 - Chief of Operations 12 months
60 Colonel*** U.S. Air Force Senior Advisor to Deputy MoD - Strategic Communications
Senior Advisor to ANA General Staff G3/5/7
12 months
53 Captain (USN)*** U.S. Navy Senior Advisor to Deputy MoD - Communications 11 months
Ministry of Interior Advisors (13)
5 SES** Office of the Secretary of Defense Chief of Advisors, Afghan Ministry of Interior Development
Advisor to Afghan MoI Chief of Staff
12 months
9 Colonel U.S. Army, Infantry Senior Advisor to Deputy MoI - Administration 12 months
64 GS-15 Office of the Secretary of Defense Senior Advisor to Deputy MoI - Administration 12 months
23 Contractor** DynCorp Senior Advisor to Deputy MoI - Administration
Senior Advisor to MoI Chief of Staff
48 months
44 Colonel U.S. Army, Infantry Senior Advisor to Deputy MoI - Strategy and Policy 12 months
6 Colonel U.S. Army, Infantry Senior Advisor to Deputy MoI - Strategy and Policy 12 months
19 GS-15 Office of the Secretary of Defense Advisor & Director, MoI Development & Transition 12 months
2 Colonel U.S. Army, Aviation Senior Advisor to Deputy MoI - Counternarcotics 12 months
28 Colonel U.S. Army, Aviation Senior Advisor to Deputy MoI - Counternarcotics 11 months
49 Lt. Colonel U.S. Army, Aviation Senior Advisor to MoI Chief of Afghan Local Police 12 months
38 Lt. Commander** U.S. Navy, JAG Senior Advisor to Legal Advisor to MoI
Senior Advisor to Chief of Legal Affairs, Afghan National Police
Senior Advisor to Chief fo Afghan Anti-Crime Police
12 months
60 Colonel*** U.S. Air Force Senior Advisor to Director, Afghan Public Protection Force
Senior Advisor to Director, Afghan Reintegration Program
12 months
53 Captain (USN)*** U.S. Navy Senior Advisor to Deputy MoI - Communications 11 months
NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan Staff and SMEs (4)
4 Captain (USN) U.S. Navy NTM-A Command Historian 12 months
59 Major U.S. Army, Armor/FA59-Strategist Strategic Planner, NTM-A Commander's Initiatives Group 12 months
1 GS-15 Office of the Secretary of Defense Founding Director, OSD MoDA Program N/A
24 GS-15 Special IG for Afghanistan Recon. (SIGAR) Program Evaluation Director N/A
* Rank ordered by political authoirty or seniority of Afghan counterpart
** Dual/triple-hatted advisor assignments or reassigned during tour
***Advised principals in both MoD and MoI
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Table 3. Tactical Level Participants 
 
Table A2.  Tactical Level Participants.
Intel
NDS ANA A-SOF ANCOP AUP ABP ALP
Embedded Trainers, Mentors & Advisors (16)
51 Colonel U.S. Army National Guard, Infantry Embedded Advisor Group Leader - Corps Level X Balkh 12 mo.
7 Colonel U.S. Army, Infantry Embedded Advisor Group Leader - Brigade Level X X X X Herat > 12 mo.
63 Colonel U.S. Army National Guard, Infantry Embedded Advisor Group Leader - Brigade Level X X Kabul > 12 mo.
56 Major U.S. Army, Infantry Embedded Advisor Team Leader - Brigade Level X Konar 12 mo.
8 Major U.S. Army, Infantry Embedded Advisor Team Member - Brigade Level X Paktika 12 mo.
43 Captain U.S. Army, Engineer Embedded Advisor Team Leader - Battalion Level X Konar 12 mo.
55 Captain U.S. Army, Infantry Embedded Advisor Team Leader - Battalion Level X Paktika 12 mo.
36 Captain U.S. Army, Infantry Embedded Advisor Team Leader - Battalion Level X Zabul 12 mo.
11 Colonel U.S. Army National Guard, Infantry Commander, Agri-business Development Team X X Nangarhar 9 - 12 mo.
16 Lt. Colonel* U.S. Army, Military Intelligence Battalion Commander X X X Kandahar 12 mo.
41 Lt. Colonel U.S. Army, Infantry Battalion Commander; Kabul Military Training Ctr X X Kabul 12 mo.
29 Lt. Colonel* U.S. Army, Military Police Battalion Commander X X Kandahar 12 mo.
21 Lt. Colonel* U.S. Marine Corps, Infantry Battalion Commander X X Helmand 9 - 12 mo.
39 Lt. Colonel* U.S. Army, Military Police Battalion Commander X Kandahar 12 mo.
35 Captain U.S. Army, Infantry Afghan Uniformed Police Trainer
Advisor to Kabul Military Training Center G1
X X X X Kabul; Khost 12 mo.
58 Captain* U.S. Army Reserve, Military Intel. Advisor to Chief of Intelligence, ANCOP
COMISAF CAAT Advisor
X X Country-wide 12 mo.
Partnered Operations (General Purpose Forces - 12)
17 Colonel German Army, Infantry Battalion Commander X X X Kabul > 12 mo.
16 Lt. Colonel* U.S. Army, Military Intelligence Battalion Commander X X X Kandahar 12 mo.
29 Lt. Colonel* U.S. Army, Military Police Battalion Commander X X Kandahar 12 mo.
21 Lt. Colonel* U.S. Marine Corps, Infantry Battalion Commander X X Helmand 9 - 12 mo.
39 Lt. Colonel* U.S. Army, Military Police Battalion Commander X Kandahar 12 mo.
67 Lt. Colonel U.S. Army, Infantry Battalion Commander X X X X Kandahar 12 mo.
62 Major U.S. Army, Infantry Battalion Executive Officer X X Kandahar 12 mo.
34 Major** U.S. Army, Infantry Battalion S3; Brigade S3; Division G5 X X X X Kandahar; Uruzgan; Zabul; 
Daykundi
>12 mo.
40 Major** U.S. Army, Infantry Rifle Company Commander
COMISAF CAAT Advisor
X X X Country-wide >12 mo.
52 Captain U.S. Army, Infantry Rifle Company Commander X X X X Kandahar 12 mo.
66 Captain U.S. Army, Infantry Rifle Company Commander X X X Paktika 12 mo.
65 Captain U.S. Army National Guard, Infantry Rifle Company Commander X Badghis 12 mo.
Partnered Operations (Special Operations Forces - 6)
3 Major U.S. Army, Special Forces Company Commander, 13x ODA X X Uruzgan 9 - 12 mo.
32 Captain U.S. Army, Special Forces Team Commander, ODA X Zabul > 12 mo.
37 Major U.S. Army, Special Forces Team Commander, ODA X X Helmand > 12 mo.
48 Captain U.S. Army, Special Forces Team Commander, ODA X Kunar 9 - 12 mo.
12 Captain U.S. Army, Special Forces Team Commander, ODA X Herat 9 - 12 mo.
47 Sergeant First Class U.S. Army, Special Forces Medical Sergeant, ODA X X X Zabul > 12 mo.
Third-Party Observers and Subject Matter Experts (9)
40 Major** U.S. Army, Infantry Rifle Company Commander
COMISAF CAAT Advisor
X X X Country-wide > 12 mo.
58 Captain* U.S. Army Reserve, Military Intel. Advisor to Chief of Intelligence, ANCOP
COMISAF CAAT Advisor
X X Country-wide 12 mo.
30 Civilian Contractor Undisclosed Contracting Firm COMISAF CAAT Advisor X X Country-wide 6 - 9 mo.
22 Civilian Contractor U.S. Army Human Terrain System Human Terrain Team Social Scientist X X X X Kandahar 6 - 9 mo.
46 Civilian Contractor U.S. Army Human Terrain System Human Terrain Team Social Scientist X X Paktika; Paktiya; Khost 9 - 12 mo.
31 Program Manager RAND Corporation Analyst, CJSOTF-A X Country-wide 6 - 9 mo.
54 Program Manager RAND Corporation Analyst, CJSOTF-A X Country-wide 9 - 12 mo.
33 Civilian Contractor DynCorp CIVPOL, Program Manger, DynCorp Country-wide > 12 mo.
13 Civilian Contractor DynCorp VP, Training and Mentoring, DynCorp X X X Country-wide N/A
* Individual and/or unit conducted both embedded advising and partnered tactical operations.
** Individual had multiple training or advising deployments
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 Sample Deployment Coverage Over Time 
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 Strategic Participant Deployment Coverage Over Time 
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 Tactical Participant Deployment Coverage Over Time 
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Appendix B 
Table 4. Semi-Structured Interview Protocol 
 







1.  When you were deployed (mo/yr)? X X X
2.  Describe your job while deployed. X X X
3.  How were you selected for this position? X X
NATO-ANSF Interaction Context
4.  Could you please describe your experience with respect to training/advising Afghan security 
forces?  
X X X
5.  Please describe the violence levels. X X X
 
Socialization Mechanisms
6.  Please share with me your philosophy on partnering, advising, training.  Your unit’s? X X X
7.  Could you describe for me an instance in which you felt that your strategies in working with your 
counterparts were effective? What do you attribute that success to?
X X X
8.  Could you describe for me an instance in which you felt that your strategies in working with your 
counterparts were unsuccessful? What do you attribute that lack of success to?
X X X
9.  Did you ever experience any resistance or undermining behavior?  If so, please describe. X X X
10.  What motivated your Afghan partner(s)?  Did their motivation vary across individuals? X X X
Operational Funding
11.  What discretion did you, or your unit, have to leverage funding (ASFF / CERP / FUOP) or 
major contracts for your Afghan partners?   How did you use it?
X X X
Monitoring and Evaluation; Institutional/Policy/Norm Transfer
12.  Were you required to monitor capacity or professional development with your ANSF 
counterpart(s)?  How did you do this? Was this standardized in any way?
X X X
13.  Did you observe any changes in capacity or professionalism?  Please describe. X X X
14.   Did you every have discussions of ‘civilian control’, ‘superintendence’, or what it means to be 
a professional soldier/police officer?
X X X
Contractor Support
15.  Did you work at all with private contractor trainers or advisors?  If so, please descibe how they 
were employed.  What monitoring/oversight tools did you have at your disposal?
X X
Private Contractor Trainers / Advisors
16.  Were your duties and responsibilities ever amended?  Why?  How often? X
17.  Did you ever deviate from your task order / statement of work / program of instruction in to 
complete your job?  Why?  How often?  Did you receive any inquiries from your counterparts?
X
18.  Did you ever face any conflicts or dilemmas between your task order / program of instruction 
and your relationship with your local partner?
X
Contract Managers
19.  Who did you report to (or supervise)?  What was that interaction like? X X
20.  How much discretion did you have to amend your contractor’s task orders?  Was this discretion 
(or lack thereof) significant toward your mission? What were some of the considerations you would 
take into account before and after amending task orders?
X X
Closing
21.  What was your relationship with your counterparts like when you left? X X
22.  Do you have one lasting story or memory from your deployment? X X X
23.  Is there anything I didn’t ask that you think would be valuable to know? X X X
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Appendix C 
 
 Training and Advising Contracts as a Proportion of Overall U.S. 
Reconstruction Spending in Afghanistan 
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Contract / Task Order Recipient Purchaser Subtotal Total Obligated Purpose Corresponding Audit Documents
S-LMAQM-04-C-0033
   (T.O.) S-AQMPD-04-C-1076 DoS/INL 12/7/2004 5/20/20091 294,393,788$       Poppy Eradication/Training DoS IG AUD/IQO-07-48, August 2007
   (T.O.) S-AQMPD-04-F-0282 DoS/INL 6/22/2004 12/18/2005 23,722,151$         Police Training - Unspecified DoS IG AUD/IQO-07-48, August 2007
   (T.O.) S-AQMPD-04-F-0460 DoS/INL 7/12/2004 3/30/20072 59,235,046$         Police Training - Unspecified DoS IG AUD/IQO-07-48, August 2007
   (T.O.) S-AQMPD-05-F-2522 DoS/INL 3/16/2005 3/1/2006 27,025,878$         Police Training - Unspecified DoS IG AUD/IQO-07-48, August 2007
   (T.O.) S-AQMPD-05-F-1473 DoS/INL 12/15/2004 3/7/20063 82,510,133$         ANP Training - Training Centers DoS IG AUD/IQO-07-48, August 2007
   (T.O.) S-AQMPD-05-F-4305 DoS/INL 8/15/2005 12/3/20084 828,247,044$       ANP Training
DOD DOS IG Joint Audit July 2011, 10; 
DOD DOS IG ANP training LL of Contract 
Transition (August 15, 2011), 9
   (T.O.) S-AQMMA-08-F-5375 DoS/INL 7/30/2008 2/7/2013 672,787,198$       MoI/ANP Training & Advising
DOD-DOS IG ANP Compliance with 
Economy Act (August 25, 2011), 9; DOD 
DOS IG Joint Audit July 2011, 10, 48; DOD 
DOS IG ANP training LL of Contract 
Transition (August 15, 2011), 12
   (T.O.) S-AQMMA-10-F-2708 DoS/INL 9/10/2010 4/18/2011 1,315,134,040$    ANP Training
DOD-DOS IG ANP Compliance with 
Economy Act (August 25, 2011), 9; DOD 
DOS IG Joint Audit July 2011, 48; DOD 
DOS IG ANP training LL of Contract 
Transition (August 15, 2011), 12
W91CRB-10-C-0100 MPRI DoD 4/29/2010 6/15/20125 24,551,733$         MoI/ANP Training & Advising
DOD DOS IG ANP training LL of Contract 
Transition (August 15, 2011), 13
W91CRB-11-C-0053 DynCorp DoD 12/20/2010 1/14/2013 770,496,350$       MoI/ANP Training & Advising
CWC Interim Report 2-24-2011, 28; SIGAR 
2011 October, 71; DOD DOS IG ANP 
training LL of Contract Transition (August 
15, 2011), 13
Afghan Border Police W9113M-07-D-0005-0017 Academi (Xe) DoD 9/29/2008 6/25/20116 225,085,983$       225,085,983$       ABP Training & Advising
DOD DOS IG ANP training LL of Contract 
Transition (August 15, 2011), 13; 
Primary Source:  http://www.usaspending.gov TOTAL 5,028,609,409$    
Notes:
*This table present data for private sector human technical/training/advising services alone; not for ANSF facility construction, equipment purchases, or operational funds.
1. On 5/20/09, DynCorp received $4,907,908; on 9/21/12, DynCorp gave back $19,043.
2. On 3/30/07, DynCorp received $11,808,807; on 8/24/12, DynCorp gave back $68,946; 
3. On 3/7/06, DynCorp received $4,251,662; on 4/18/07, DynCorp gave back $7,226,938.
4. On 12/3/08, DynCorp received $1,710,403; on 8/15/12, DynCorp gave back $5,874,152.
5.  4/29/10 was the only date money was given to MPRI; on 6/15/12, MPRI gave back $7,689,726.
6. On 6/25/11, Xe received $12,000,000; on 8/22/11 they gave back $11,179,153.
Ministry of Interior &
Afghan National Police




705,420,065$       
456,211,646$       11/17/20104/20/2005DoDW91CRB-05-D-0014
249,208,419$       10/31/2013 (Exp.)2/12/2010DoD
DOD DOS IG Joint Audit July 2011, 10; 
DOD DOS IG ANP Training LL of Contract 
Transition (August 15, 2011), 10
Nickerson (MPRI) CWC Testimony 
12/18/09, 3
Performance Period
(Date signed / Last payment to 
recipient)
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Appendix D: Excerpt From Standards of Performance, DynCorp Contract 
W91CRB-10-C-0030, Afghan Ministry of Defense Program Support, October 9, 
2011 
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